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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC (CFI), the relator 
in this qui tam action, appeals the District Court’s dismissal 
of its complaint with prejudice and the court’s denial of CFI’s 
subsequent motion for leave to amend its complaint.  We hold 
that the District Court erred in denying CFI’s motion to 
amend its complaint on futility grounds.  Consequently, we 
will vacate that order and remand this case for further 
proceedings.   
 
I. 
 Victaulic Co., the defendant in the District Court and 
the appellee in this matter, is a Delaware corporation with its 
headquarters in Easton, Pennsylvania.  It is a global 
manufacturer and distributor of pipe fittings.  CFI, a limited 
liability company based in Maryland, is made up of former 
insiders from the pipe fitting industry.  According to CFI, 
although none of its employees worked for Victaulic, CFI’s 
principals have worked on numerous trade investigations 
involving pipe and tube products and have provided direct 
support to senior officials at the U.S. International Trade 
Commission and the U.S. Department of Commerce on issues 
in the industry.   
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 To better understand CFI’s allegations, it is helpful to 
explain the regulatory environment in which Victaulic 
operates.  Pipe fittings, such as those Victaulic manufactures, 
are the subject of specific, non-discretionary import 
regulations set forth in the Tariff Act of 1930.1  Pipe fittings 
must, with limited exceptions, be marked with the English 
name of the country of origin by means of one of five 
methods.2  Only if it is technically or commercially infeasible 
to mark an article by one of the five enumerated methods may 
a pipe fitting be marked in another manner.  Under no 
circumstances may an article of foreign origin be completely 
unmarked.3  If an importer releases unmarked or improperly 
marked goods into the stream of commerce in the United 
States, the importer owes a duty of 10 per centum ad valorem 
on the improperly marked goods.4  This duty, known as a 
“marking duty,” is deemed to have accrued at the time of 
importation and must be paid in addition to any other duty 
imposed by law.5   
 
This is not to say, however, that an importer may bring 
improperly marked goods into the United States merely by 
paying a marking duty.  Instead, if improperly marked goods 
are imported and discovered by customs officials, an importer 
has three options:  (1) re-export the goods, (2) destroy them, 
or (3) mark them appropriately so that they may be released 
from the custody of the United States for sale in the domestic 
                                              
1 19 U.S.C. § 1304(c). 
2 Id. § 1304(c)(1). 
3 Id. § 1304(c)(2). 
4 19 U.S.C. § 1304(i). 
5 Id. 
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market.6  Customs officials at United States ports of entry are 
unable to inspect every import; they rely primarily on the 
importers themselves to self-report any duties owed and any 
goods that are unmarked or improperly marked.  In those 
instances where improperly marked goods enter the stream of 
commerce in the United States, the marking duty is due, 
retroactive to the time of importation.7  Imposition of the duty 
is non-discretionary since, by statute, such duties “shall not be 
remitted wholly or in part nor shall payment thereof be 
avoidable for any cause.”8  In setting forth this regulatory 
scheme, Congress specifically noted that marking duties 
“shall not be construed to be penal” and are to be considered 
similar to any other customs duty owed.9   
 
The gravamen of CFI’s allegations is that Victaulic 
has, over the past decade, imported millions of pounds of 
improperly marked pipe fittings without disclosing that the 
fittings are improperly marked.  Since this improper marking 
was not discovered by customs officials, Victaulic avoided 
paying marking duties on these fittings.  As support for its 
claims, CFI’s complaint alleged that Victaulic imported 
approximately 83 million pounds of fittings from overseas 
between 2003 and 2013 and a miniscule fraction of 
Victaulic’s pipe fittings for sale in the U.S. bear any 
indication of their foreign origin, with an even smaller 
percentage bearing country of origin markings compliant with 
the applicable statute.  According to the complaint, “Victaulic 
                                              
6 Id.  
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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is able to successfully (albeit unlawfully) import its unmarked 
pipe fittings into the United States by knowingly failing to 
pay or disclose to the CBP [Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection] the marking duties the company owes . . . by, 
among other things, falsifying its entry documents and 
otherwise concealing the foreign source of its pipe fittings 
such that CBP will not detect the company’s fraud.” 
 
These actions, according to CFI, give rise to the 
present qui tam action under the so-called “reverse false 
claims” provision in the False Claims Act (FCA).10  
Typically, a claim under the FCA alleges that a person or 
company submitted a bill to the government for work that 
was not performed or was performed improperly, resulting in 
an undeserved payment flowing to that person or company.  
The FCA was enacted as a reaction to rampant fraud and 
price gouging by merchants supplying the Union army during 
the Civil War.11  In this case, by contrast, the allegation is not 
that Victaulic is obtaining monies from the government to 
which it is not entitled, but rather that it is retaining money it 
should have paid the government in the form of marking 
duties.  Wrongful retention cases such as these are known as 
“reverse false claims” actions. 
 
CFI filed its initial complaint, under seal, on May 30, 
2013, in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  On August 7, the United States 
                                              
10 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).  This section was formerly 
codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7). 
11 See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. 
Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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declined to intervene in the matter.  After being served, 
Victaulic filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  Victaulic contested 
the District Court’s jurisdiction by contending that CFI’s 
complaint violated the FCA’s ban on suits based primarily on 
publicly available information.12  Victaulic alleged, in the 
alternative, that the complaint failed to present a plausible 
claim because it was too conclusory.  Discovery was stayed 
pending the District Court’s decision on the motion to 
dismiss. 
 
When the District Court held a hearing on Victaulic’s 
motion, argument focused on Victaulic’s contentions that the 
FCA’s public disclosure bar was jurisdictional and that all of 
the information in CFI’s complaint was publicly available.  In 
its subsequent opinion, the District Court rejected these 
arguments, holding that the FCA’s public disclosure bar was 
not jurisdictional and, in any event, CFI’s complaint was not 
based on publicly available information within the meaning 
of the FCA. 
 
Then, turning to Victaulic’s alternative argument that 
the claim was conclusory, the District Court held that CFI’s 
complaint did not state a claim on which relief could be 
granted because it failed to cross the Twombly/Iqbal threshold 
from possible to plausible.  In doing so, the District Court 
mentioned that it believed the FCA’s reverse false claims 
provision did not cover failure to pay marking duties, but 
declined to rule on those grounds because the complaint was 
based on legal conclusions unsupportable by the facts alleged.  
                                              
12 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
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The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, 
without any discussion of why CFI should not be afforded the 
opportunity to amend its complaint to solve any perceived 
deficiencies. 
 
CFI promptly moved for relief from judgment and for 
leave to amend its complaint, including a proposed First 
Amended Complaint (FAC) that contained substantially more 
detailed factual allegations.  While the contours of the claim 
remains the same in both complaints, the FAC includes 
details that address at least some of the concerns that the 
District Court had expressed in its opinion.  Of particular 
import, the FAC details the rationale behind CFI’s 
investigation of Victaulic and discusses the methodology CFI 
used to develop its claims. 
 
This investigation involved a multifaceted analysis 
before filing suit, consisting of two parts:  (1) an analysis of 
shipping manifest data purporting to show that Victaulic 
imports the majority of its pipe fittings from overseas and (2) 
a study of listings from the online auction site eBay for 
Victaulic products that CFI used as a proxy for the Victaulic 
product market.  Out of the more than 200 listings for 
Victaulic pipe fittings CFI reviewed, there were virtually no 
products for sale that CFI considers properly marked.  Based 
on its analysis, CFI concluded that systematic fraud must be 
occurring, since the majority of Victaulic’s products are 
imported but virtually no products for sale on the secondary 
market are properly marked with the foreign country of origin 
markings required by law.   
 
CFI bolstered the FAC by attaching an expert 
declaration stating that CFI’s analysis “provides 
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‘overwhelming evidence’ that Victaulic is not properly 
marking its pipe fittings,” and attached actual examples of the 
data on which CFI and its expert based their analyses.  
Moreover, the FAC included two allegations that did not 
appear in the original complaint:  a statement from an 
unnamed witness who recalled a specific instance of 
obtaining improperly labeled Victaulic products, and a 
reference to a District Court hearing where, according to CFI, 
Victaulic showed a photograph of a pipe fitting to the court 
that CFI contends was a prime example of improper marking. 
 
The District Court denied CFI’s motions on two 
grounds.  First, it held that CFI unduly delayed its motion for 
leave to amend because it should have been on notice that the 
District Court was considering dismissing the complaint 
based on comments the court made at the motions hearing.  
Second, the District Court held that the FAC was futile, 
stating explicitly that failure to pay marking duties could not, 
as a matter of law, give rise to a reverse false claims action 
because the duties were too attenuated and contingent to 
qualify as the types of obligations to pay money to the 
government covered by the FCA.  This appeal followed, in 
which the United States appears as amicus curiae, arguing 
that the District Court’s interpretation of the FCA’s reverse 
false claims provision is incorrect and that marking duty 
obligations are covered by the FCA.13 
 
II. 
                                              
13 The United States expresses no opinion on whether CFI 
should have been granted leave to amend its complaint or 
whether the complaint states a claim. 
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The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 31 U.S.C. § 3732.  We have 
jurisdiction over the District Court’s orders dismissing the 
complaint, denying relief from judgment, and denying CFI’s 
motion for leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review a District Court’s judgment of dismissal pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo.14  We 
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
“determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”15 
 
We review a District Court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) 
motion for relief from judgment for abuse of discretion 
(except for questions of law, which are subject to plenary 
review).16  Similarly, we review a Rule 15 motion for leave to 
amend a complaint for abuse of discretion, and if “a timely 
motion to amend judgment is filed under Rule 59(e), the Rule 
15 and 59 inquiries turn on the same factors.”17  Under such a 
review, we are cognizant of Rule 15’s admonition that leave 
to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.”18  
                                              
14 Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cnty., 804 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
15 Id. (quoting Powell v. Weiss, 757 F.3d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 
2014)).  
16 Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 272 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
17 Id. 
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 
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“A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it 
based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law . . ..”19 
 
III. 
There are three instances when a court typically may 
exercise its discretion to deny a Rule 15(a) motion for leave 
to amend:  when “(1) the moving party has demonstrated 
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment 
would be futile, or (3) the amendment would prejudice the 
other party.”20  The District Court relied on two of those 
grounds in denying CFI’s motion for leave to amend:  undue 
delay and futility.  We will explain why CFI’s delay was not 
undue before turning to the merits of the FAC.   
 
A. 
Generally, Rule 15 motions should be granted.  In 
Foman v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental 
purpose of Rule 15 is to allow a plaintiff “an opportunity to 
test his claim on the merits,” and although “the grant or denial 
of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the 
District Court,” that discretion is abused if it is exercised 
                                              
19 Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1744, 1748 n.2 (2014) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)). 
20 U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 
F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Luke v. Arnold, 232 
F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
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without giving the plaintiff sufficient opportunity to make her 
case.21   
 
At oral argument before us, counsel for CFI admitted 
that CFI was “waiting to see what the court said” before filing 
its motion to amend its complaint because CFI had “thought 
the court was going to deny the motion to dismiss.”  The 
District Court held that this tactic made CFI’s delay undue 
because CFI was “on notice of the defects in its complaint 
once Victaulic moved for dismissal,” and CFI was notified 
“that the Court was considering a dismissal with prejudice,” 
based on comments made from the bench during a hearing on 
Victaulic’s motion.  The record, however, is not so clear.    
  
First, the mere fact that a defendant files a motion to 
dismiss is not necessarily sufficient to put a plaintiff on notice 
that the court will find his complaint to be deficient.  One of 
the consequences of the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Twombly and Iqbal22 is a general increase in the number of 
motions to dismiss filed against plaintiffs.  As a result, 
plaintiffs are now twice as likely to face a motion to 
dismiss.23  It is highly unlikely that in the years since 
Twombly was decided, plaintiffs’ complaints are dramatically 
                                              
21 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 
22 Twombly and Iqbal require a complaint to “state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
23 Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An 
Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions 
to Dismiss, 6 F. Courts L. Rev. 1, 15 (2011). 
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worse or less meritorious.  Rather, defendants now have 
incentive “to challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s 
complaint more frequently.”24  More frequent motions to 
dismiss are not necessarily more meritorious motions to 
dismiss.  
 
Second, in addition to arguing that CFI’s complaint did 
not pass muster under the applicable pleading standards, 
Victaulic argued that the public disclosure bar in the FCA 
deprived the District Court of jurisdiction over the case.  
Much of the hearing on Victaulic’s motion to dismiss dealt 
with the two relevant parts of that issue:  whether the public 
disclosure bar was jurisdictional and whether the information 
on which CFI’s complaint is based was in the public domain 
within the meaning of the FCA.  The District Court rejected 
Victaulic’s arguments, finding that the information on which 
CFI based its complaint was not in the public domain and 
holding that the public disclosure bar is not jurisdictional.  
Having disposed of these two substantial issues, the District 
Court then granted the motion to dismiss on the other ground 
raised by Victaulic:  that the complaint was based on legal 
conclusions, not supported by fact. 
 
CFI then moved to amend its complaint.  In denying 
the motion, the District Court opined that, based on comments 
from the bench, the court itself had put CFI on notice that its 
complaint would be dismissed with prejudice.  We disagree.  
As was pointed out at oral argument before us, judges at all 
levels make statements and ask questions during hearings that 
may not be a clear indication of the court’s views or how a 
                                              
24 Id.  
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case will eventually be decided.  To expect the plaintiff to 
pick, from dozens of questions and statements over the course 
of a hearing, those questions that signal what the court will 
ultimately decide is to expect too much.   
 
Moreover, even though at the hearing the District 
Court called the plaintiff’s complaint “bare bones” and 
implied that the plaintiff might need to plead more facts, 
those statements were not a ruling, a holding, or an 
explanation of how the court intended to rule.  We cannot see 
how, on this record, CFI could have reasonably been expected 
to understand from the District Court’s comments that CFI 
was in danger of having its entire suit dismissed with 
prejudice were it not to move to amend its complaint 
immediately after argument, instead of immediately after the 
decision came down.   
 
This is not to say that a plaintiff will never be on 
notice of potential deficiencies based on a motion to dismiss 
or comments from the bench.  Nevertheless, in the context of 
a typical Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff is unlikely to know 
whether his complaint is actually deficient—and in need of 
revision—until after the District Court has ruled.  Once CFI 
had actual notice of the perceived deficiencies in its 
complaint, it promptly moved to file its first amended 
complaint.   
 
Third, we have rarely upheld a dismissal with 
prejudice of a complaint when the plaintiff has been given no 
opportunity to amend.  Victaulic attempts to sidestep this fact 
by arguing that the FAC is a de facto second amended 
complaint because the District Court considered additional 
evidence outside the original complaint at the hearing on 
15 
 
Victaulic’s motion.  As a procedural matter, there is no basis 
for this contention.  The record is clear that CFI’s motion for 
leave to amend was CFI’s first attempt to file an amended 
complaint.   
 
Moreover, at the outset of the hearing on Victaulic’s 
motion to dismiss, the District Court noted that it had 
received “a lot of factual material from the plaintiff that goes 
beyond the allegations of the complaint.”  Since Victaulic’s 
motion was filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) as well as Rule 
12(b)(6), consideration of this information was proper, to a 
point.  When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is evaluated as a “factual 
attack” on the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, “the court 
may consider evidence outside the pleadings” in evaluating 
that attack.25  When a motion to dismiss implicates both Rule 
12(b)(6) and Rule 12(b)(1), outside evidence may be 
considered for Rule 12(b)(1) purposes but not for Rule 
12(b)(6) purposes.26 
 
CFI’s counsel made this point at the hearing before the 
District Court, stating that CFI had submitted additional 
information only for purposes of the Rule 12(b)(1) motion 
and that that evidence should not be considered for the Rule 
12(b)(6) motion.  The District Court seems to have accepted 
the point, noting that it believed the additional evidence 
would help the court evaluate both parts of the motion, but 
acknowledging that the additional evidence was only 
submitted for the Rule 12(b)(1) motion.  In its opinion, 
                                              
25 Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
26 Id. at 178. 
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however, the District Court noted that it was not considering 
“these additional facts in assessing the sufficiency of the 
complaint itself,” but that it would consider the facts “in 
determining . . . whether, having dismissed the original 
complaint, the Court should grant CFI leave to file an 
amended complaint containing these additional factual 
allegations.”  The District Court did not refer to any legal 
basis for considering evidence outside the complaint in 
determining whether to dismiss a complaint with prejudice on 
a 12(b)(6) motion.  Moreover, the District Court did not have 
a motion to amend pending before it when it issued its 
opinion, making any consideration of whether to grant such a 
motion hypothetical at best. 
 
In essence, by considering the evidence submitted on 
the Rule 12(b)(1) motion when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, the District Court converted Victaulic’s Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion into a motion for summary judgment.  The court could 
have done so pursuant to Rule 12(d), under which 
consideration of evidence submitted outside the complaint 
would be proper.  Rule 12(d) requires, however, that the 
parties “be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the 
material that is pertinent to the motion.”27  The District Court 
did not notify the parties that it was converting Victaulic’s 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment under 
Rule 12(d), and CFI was not given a reasonable opportunity 
to present more information.   
 
In addition to these procedural irregularities, the 
District Court abused its discretion in finding that CFI’s 
                                              
27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 
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attempt to amend its complaint constituted undue delay.  The 
District Court held that “CFI is imposing an unwarranted 
burden on the Court by requiring the Court to waste judicial 
resources revisiting issues that could have been addressed 
earlier,” and that “the FAC rests almost entirely on 
information that was already before the Court or that CFI 
could have presented to the Court prior to dismissal.”   
 
The District Court relied on several cases28 to reach its 
conclusion.  That reliance is, however, misplaced.  It is true 
that in Jang v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc., we noted that 
we have “declined to reward a wait-and-see approach to 
pleading.”29  In context, however, that statement was of no 
practical import, since in Jang we reversed the District 
Court’s entry of judgment on the pleadings and remanded for 
further proceedings, explicitly noting that the plaintiff 
remained “free to file a new motion for leave to amend.”30   
Similarly, in In re: Adams Golf, Inc. Securities 
Litigation, we reversed a District Court’s decision granting a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion in part, but affirmed the denial of a 
motion for leave to amend based on futility and “undue 
delay.”31  In that case, the District Court had already allowed 
one Amended Complaint and found that the proposed Second 
                                              
28 See Jang v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc., 729 F.3d 357, 
368 (3d Cir. 2013); In re: Adams Golf, Inc. Securities 
Litigation, 381 F.3d 267, 280–81 (3d Cir. 2004); California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Chubb Corp. 
(CPERS), 394 F.3d 126, 163 (3d Cir. 2004). 
29 729 F.3d at 368. 
30 Id. 
31 381 F.3d at 280–81. 
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Amended Complaint was futile since it did not contain new 
material allegations.32  Also, in California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System v. Chubb Corp. (CPERS), the case 
involved allegations of securities fraud subject to the Public 
Securities Litigation Reform Act.  The court affirmed the 
denial of a motion for leave to amend after the district court 
had previously allowed two amended complaints, denied both 
and given extensive guidance to the plaintiff as to the 
deficiencies the district court saw with the amended 
complaints.33   
 
Finally, the District Court relied upon Arthur v. 
Maersk, Inc.,34 as an example of our rejection of the “wait-
and-see approach to pleading.”  In Arthur, we held that a 
delay of less than a year from the filing of an initial complaint 
to the filing of an amended complaint is rarely, if ever, 
sufficient to become undue.35  Here, the elapsed time from 
filing of the initial complaint—which had to be filed under 
seal pursuant to the FCA and could not be served on the 
defendant—to the amended complaint was approximately 
sixteen months.  Under the circumstances, the lapse of time is 
not “so excessive as to be presumptively unreasonable.”36 
 
                                              
32 Id. at 280; 280 n.12. 
33 394 F.3d at 163. 
34 434 F.3d at 204. 
35 Id. at 205 (citing Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639–40 
(6th Cir. 1982) and Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 1981)). 
36 Id. 
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In none of the cases the District Court relied upon did 
we uphold a dismissal with prejudice where the plaintiff had 
been given no opportunity to amend its complaint and would 
not be given an opportunity to amend in the future.   
 
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the District 
Court’s denial of the CFI’s motion for leave to amend was 
error.  Nevertheless, the District Court would have been 
justified in denying CFI’s motion if the FAC was itself futile, 
which was the alternative ground on which the District Court 
based its opinion.  We turn to that rationale next. 
 
B. 
In rejecting CFI’s FAC as futile, the District Court 
held that, as a matter of law, failure to pay marking duties 
could not give rise to a reverse FCA claim and that CFI failed 
to meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b).  Both holdings were error.  We will first 
address why marking duties fall within the FCA’s reverse 
false claims provision before addressing the alleged 
deficiencies in CFI’s FAC. 
1. 
The reverse false claims provision of the FCA37 was 
revised as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 
2009 (FERA).38  Although many reforms were enacted as part 
of the FERA, Congress specifically enacted one portion in 
                                              
37 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2009). 
38 Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). 
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response to a perceived narrowing of the scope of the reverse 
false claims provision.   
 
Prior to 2009, the reverse false claims provision 
provided for a civil penalty for one who “knowingly makes, 
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement 
to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit 
money or property to the Government.”39  The word 
“obligation” was not defined in the statute.40  The FERA 
made two substantial changes.  First, it added to the reverse 
false claims provision the phrase “or knowingly conceals or 
knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation 
to pay or transmit money or property to the Government”.41  
Second, it defined an “obligation” as “an established duty, 
whether or not fixed, arising from an express or implied 
contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee relationship, 
from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or 
regulation, or from the retention of any overpayment.”42  
These two sections broadened the scope to which reverse 
false claims liability would attach. 
 
The new definition was, in part, a reaction to the 
decision in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. 
The Limited, Inc. (ATMI), which held that the term 
“obligation” should be afforded “a different, and more 
limited, meaning” than the meaning afforded the word 
“claim” in the FCA, and that reverse false claims liability 
                                              
39 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (1994) (emphasis added). 
40 Id. 
41 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2009). 
42 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3) (2009). 
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should be viewed more narrowly than general false claims 
liability.43  Specifically, the ATMI court limited reverse false 
claims liability to those circumstances where “an obligation 
in the nature of those that gave rise to actions of debt at 
common law for money or things owed” would have arisen.44 
 
The Senate Report on the FERA states that the new 
definition of “obligation” was intended to address “confusion 
among courts that have developed conflicting definitions.”45  
The FERA rejected the reasoning in ATMI, with the Senate 
Report highlighting the definition’s express inclusion of 
“contingent, non-fixed obligations” that encompasses “the 
spectrum of possibilities from the fixed amount debt 
obligation,” typically at issue at common law, “to the instance 
where there is a relationship between the Government and a 
person that results in the duty to pay the Government money, 
whether or not the amount owed is yet fixed.”46  In effect, the 
FERA expressly rejected ATMI’s narrow interpretation of the 
FCA’s reverse false claims provision in favor of a more 
broadly inclusive definition. 
 
Of particular importance here, the Senate Report 
discussed “customs duties for mismarking country of origin,” 
and how such duties would be covered by the amended 
reverse false claims provision.47  The Report notes that an 
                                              
43 See 190 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 1999). 
44 Id. at 735 (quoting United States v. Q Int’l Courier, Inc., 
131 F.3d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
45 S. Rep. 111-10, at 14 (2009).   
46 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47 Id. at 14 n.10. 
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early version of the FERA named marking duties explicitly in 
the definition of “obligation” so as to leave no doubt about 
the abrogation of ATMI, but the Senate considered the 
language in the new definition so clear that “any such specific 
language would be unnecessary,” since “customs duties 
clearly fall within the new definition of the term 
‘obligation.’”48  With this background in mind, we turn to the 
conduct at issue here. 
 
At the outset, in reviewing the marking duty provision 
of the Tariff Act, the District Court held that “an importer 
does not owe marking duties upon importation of unmarked 
or mismarked merchandise.”  While technically correct, this 
makes too fine a distinction between the time at which an 
importer must pay marking duties and the time at which such 
duties accrue.  It is true, as Victaulic argues, that when 
mismarked or unmarked goods are in government custody the 
importer may not simply pay marking duties to obtain the 
release of such goods.49  By statute, such goods must be 
properly marked, re-exported, or destroyed under government 
supervision.50  Yet, if such goods nevertheless escape 
detection and are released into the United States, the ten 
percent ad valorem duty is deemed to “have accrued at the 
time of importation” and is due and owing, without 
exception.51 
 
                                              
48 Id. 
49 See 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a), (c), (i). 
50 Id. § 1304(i). 
51 Id. 
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This is precisely what CFI alleges Victaulic did in a 
systematic way for years.  Victaulic, according to CFI, knew 
its goods were not marked properly and, therefore, knew that 
the imported pipe fittings should not have been released from 
government custody.  Had Victaulic informed the government 
of this state of affairs, the goods would not have been allowed 
into the country.  By staying silent, CFI alleges that Victaulic 
made a choice—to pay the ten percent marking duty owed on 
its goods, if its scheme was discovered, instead of paying to 
have the goods marked properly, re-exported, or destroyed.  
Hence, in CFI’s view, Victaulic knowingly concealed 
information from the government by not informing customs 
officials that the imported pipe fittings were not marked 
properly.  According to CFI, once the pipe fittings cleared 
customs, Victaulic knew it owed marking duties that accrued 
on importation but did not pay them.  This, in CFI’s view, 
gives rise to reverse false claims liability for the unpaid 
marking duties. 
 
The plain text of the FCA’s reverse claims provision is 
clear:  any individual who “knowingly conceals or knowingly 
and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or 
transmit money or property to the Government” may be 
subject to liability.52  As alleged by CFI in the amended 
complaint, Victaulic declined to notify the Bureau of Customs 
and Border Protection of its pipe fittings’ non-conforming 
status.  This failure to notify resulted in the pipe fittings being 
released into the stream of commerce in the United States 
and, consequently, marking duties being owed and not paid. 
 
                                              
52 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (emphasis added). 
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The District Court held that this conduct is immaterial 
and cannot give rise to a reverse false claims liability.  To 
reach this conclusion, the court followed the reasoning in 
ATMI, but, as previously discussed, that reasoning has been 
called into doubt, if not entirely abrogated, by the FERA.  
Prior to the FERA, the “knowingly and improperly avoids or 
decreases an obligation” language was absent from the 
FCA.53  In the pre-FERA FCA, a false statement or record 
was a necessary element for reverse FCA liability to attach.54  
A false statement is no longer a required element, since the 
post-FERA FCA specifies that mere knowledge and 
avoidance of an obligation is sufficient, without the 
submission of a false record, to give rise to liability.55  
Consequently, the District Court’s reliance on ATMI and 
ATMI’s focus on the submission of a false record is 
misplaced. 
 
Indeed, the District Court’s lengthy discussion of 
whether Victaulic filled out its customs forms in a proper 
manner is ultimately of no import since, under the post-FERA 
FCA, Victaulic need not have made any express statement to 
the government to give rise to reverse false claims liability.  
The statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1), requires an importer to 
provide “such information as is necessary to enable [CBP] to 
determine whether [its] merchandise may be released from 
the custody of [CBP]” and to “enable [CBP] to properly 
assess duties on [imported] merchandise.”  If Victaulic 
                                              
53 Compare id. with 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (1994). 
54 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (1994); see also ATMI, 190 
F.3d at 736. 
55 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). 
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knowingly failed to disclose to CBP the fact that its goods 
were unmarked or improperly marked despite its affirmative 
obligation to do so under § 1484(a)(1) and if such goods 
nevertheless escaped detection and were released into the 
United States, Victaulic would be liable under the FCA.  
Thus, CFI need only prove that Victaulic knew its pipe 
fittings were improperly marked and did not notify the 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, since to do so is to 
conceal information customs officials needed to know in 
order to determine whether to release Victaulic’s goods from 
its custody.56 
 
From a policy perspective, the possibility of reverse 
false claims liability in such circumstances makes sense in the 
context of the larger import/export regulatory scheme created 
by Congress.  Because of the government’s inability to 
inspect every shipment entering the United States, an 
importer may have an incentive to decline to mention that its 
goods are mismarked on the assumption that the mismarking 
will not be discovered.  In doing so, an importer avoids its 
obligation under 19 U.S.C. § 1484 to provide the government 
with such information as is necessary to enable the Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection to determine whether the 
merchandise may be released from government custody or 
whether it must be properly marked, re-exported or destroyed 
                                              
56 Given that here, § 1484 requires importers to disclose to 
CBP that goods are improperly marked, we have no need to 
address how, if at all, the FCA would apply in the absence of 
an affirmative obligation to disclose separate from the 
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the 
government. 
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pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1304(i).  Moreover, if the importer 
believes the value of bringing unmarked or improperly 
marked goods into the country exceeds the risk that the 
deception will be discovered and the ten percent ad valorem 
duty will be owed, an importer may decline to mention that 
its goods are mismarked, since the chance that some goods 
will be discovered as mismarked and that marking duties will 
be owed would still result in a net gain to the company.  
Reverse false claims liability changes that value proposition 
because a finding of deception carries the possibility of treble 
damages. 
 
The statutory text, legislative history, and policy 
rationale underlying the regulatory scheme all lead to one 
conclusion:  reverse false claims liability may attach as a 
result of avoiding marking duties.  Consequently, the District 
Court erred in holding otherwise.   
 
2. 
The District Court’s determination that CFI’s FAC 
failed to meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 8(a)57 and 9(b)58 is also in error.  At the 
motion to dismiss stage, a court must “accept as true all of the 
allegations contained in a complaint,” make all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and refrain from engaging 
                                              
57 Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a 
short and plain statement of the claim . . ..” 
58 Rule 9(b) provides that in “alleging fraud . . ., a party must 
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud . . 
..” 
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in any credibility determinations.59  In the FAC, CFI lays out 
in great detail each shipment of pipe-fittings Victaulic 
imported during the requisite time period, as well as the 
methodology pursuant to which CFI concluded that these 
shipments consisted of improperly marked or unmarked 
goods for which the marking duties were not paid.  Given the 
operation of customs marking duties, CFI’s discovery of what 
it believes to be unmarked or improperly marked goods in the 
stream of commerce in the United States plausibly shows 
liability under the FCA. 
 
This “discovery” by CFI must of course be based on a 
reliable methodology.  The FAC details the process by which 
CFI came to its conclusions.  After determining that a 
“significant majority”60 of Victaulic’s pipe fittings were 
imported from China and Poland, CFI reasoned that “one 
would expect to see Victaulic pipe fittings sold in the United 
States and manufactured in recent years bearing ‘Made in 
China’ or ‘Made in Poland’ country-of-origin markings.”61  In 
the FAC, CFI then describes how it “executed a unique study 
of the secondary market for Victaulic pipe fittings (CFI’s 
‘product study’), with the goal of objectively determining 
what percentage of Victaulic pipe fittings for sale in the 
United States have foreign country-of-origin markings.”62   
 
CFI attached to the FAC a report by its expert, 
Abraham J. Wyner, Ph.D., a professor of Statistics at the 
                                              
59 See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
60 JA 311, 313. 
61 JA 304. 
62 Id. 
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University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business.  
Professor Wyner explained that because CFI did not “have 
access to direct evidence that traces and tracks imported 
Victaulic pipe fittings in the U.S. supply chain,” “statistical 
methods can be used to establish indirect evidence.”  
Professor Wyner then “opines that the process chosen by CFI 
to survey the secondary market for Victaulic products ‘is 
standard practice’ in this regard.”63   
 
As set forth in the FAC, in setting up its survey, CFI 
determined that Victaulic sold pipe fittings through 
distributors and directly to end-users64 and that a review of 
such sales is only possible through a review of after-market 
sales.65  Victaulic products are sold on secondary markets in 
the United States, including on eBay which CFI determined 
“is an active and diverse secondary sales outlet for Victaulic 
products.”66  CFI then noted that a review of secondary sales 
outlets provided a much wider spectrum of total Victaulic 
sales in the country than a review of the sales of a particular 
distributor.  A secondary market sales review included 
“different channels of distribution, as well as a wider range of 
dates in which sales might have been made.”67   
 
Professor Wyner concluded that “CFI’s findings are so 
stark that the only conclusion one can possibly reach is that 
                                              
63 JA 317. 
64 Id. 
65 JA 318. 
66 JA 317. 
67 JA 318. 
29 
 
Victaulic is not properly marking its imports.”68  At the 
motion to dismiss stage, without the benefit of any discovery, 
taking all facts as true, and making all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the plaintiff, we conclude that that showing is 
enough to allow this matter to proceed. 
 
It is this study, however, that the dissent describes as 
“unsupported assumptions” and “numerical guesswork.”  The 
dissent criticizes the numbers arrived at by CFI, for instance 
that statistically less than 2% of the Victaulic pipe fittings in 
the secondary market bore foreign country of origin 
markings.69  That finding of less than 2% is not, however, 
necessary to demonstrate the plausibility that, since Victaulic 
is importing a “significant majority” of its pipefittings, some 
approximation of that number of Victaulic pipefittings with 
foreign country-of-origin markings would show up in the 
secondary market.70 71 
                                              
68 JA 305 (emphasis added). 
69 JA 304 
70 JA 316. 
71 This result differs from that, for example, in Burgis v. New 
York City Department of Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 
2015), in which plaintiffs alleged that the sanitation 
department was discriminating against employees based on 
race.  The Second Circuit held that statistics could sufficiently 
allege discriminatory intent as long as they are of “a level that 
makes other plausible non-discriminatory explanations very 
unlikely.”  Id. at 69.  The statistics there showed only that a 
majority of employees at multiple levels of the sanitation 
department were white, but showed nothing about “the 
qualifications of individuals in the applicant pool and of those 
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The District Court was skeptical of the validity of 
CFI’s methods of determining whether Victaulic had 
imported unmarked goods.  We, too, are skeptical.  There is 
little evidence to show that CFI’s unusual procedure of 
reviewing eBay listings is an accurate proxy for the universe 
of Victaulic’s products available for sale in the United States.  
Yet, such skepticism is misplaced at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.  
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the variable 
being measured here, the existence of country of origin 
markings on Victaulic pipefittings, could support the results 
of CFI’s product study only if Victaulic was not properly 
marking its imported pipefittings.   
 
Turning then to Rule 9(b), we conclude that the FAC 
adequately meets  the particularity requirements for alleging 
fraud.  In the FCA context, a plaintiff “must provide 
‘particular details of a scheme to submit false claims [or 
avoid obligations] paired with reliable indicia that lead to a 
strong inference that claims were actually submitted [or 
obligations avoided].” 72  The FAC refers to voluminous 
records detailing the shipments at issue, when they entered 
the country, the alleged problems with those shipments, and, 
by operation of law, when liability would have attached.   
 
                                                                                                     
hired for each position, or the number of openings at each 
level.”  Id. at 70.  Our case is not analogous because among 
other things we have a baseline here that was missing in 
Burgis—between 54% and 91% of the entirety of Victaulic 
pipefittings should have foreign origin markings.   
72 Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 157-
58 (3d Cir. 2014) 
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Although CFI has not, as the dissent points out, alleged 
“which shipments, during which time periods, at which ports, 
were supposedly unlawful,” in Foglia, we held that the facts 
were sufficient to meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading 
standard where the plaintiff alleged that a dialysis center was 
not actually using all of the medicine for which it was getting 
reimbursed by Medicare.  “Accepting the factual assertions 
made by Foglia as true,” we reasoned, we had “patient logs 
that show that less [medicine] was used than would be 
required if it were used in the single use fashion”; Medicare’s 
reimbursement scheme presented “an opportunity for the sort 
of fraud alleged”; and only the defendant “ha[d] access to the 
documents that could easily prove the claim one way or 
another.”73    Likewise, here, we accept CFI’s allegations, as 
we must at this stage, that far more Victaulic pipe fittings on 
the secondary market should have country-of-origin 
markings, that the way marking duties are assessed provides 
an opportunity for fraud, and that only Victaulic has access to 
the documents that could prove or disprove CFI’s well-pled 
allegations.   
We conclude that, at this pleading stage, nothing more 
is required to give Victaulic adequate notice of the claims 
raised against it.   
 
In sum, failure to pay marking duties may give rise to 
reverse false claims liability.  CFI’s FAC contains just 
enough reference to hard facts, combined with other 
allegations and an expert’s declaration, to allege a plausible 
course of conduct by Victaulic to which liability would 
attach.  Thus, since CFI did not unduly delay its motion for 
                                              
73 Id. at 158. 
32 
 
leave to amend and the proposed amended pleading is not 
futile, the District Court abused its discretion in denying 
CFI’s motion.  We will therefore reverse and remand for 
further proceedings. 
 
C. 
Although we hold that CFI has done just enough to 
allow this matter to proceed, we are aware of the great 
expense and difficulty that may accompany False Claims Act 
discovery and the burden on defendants and their 
shareholders and investors of having unresolved allegations 
of fraudulent conduct in pending proceedings.  Because of 
our awareness, we have looked to the recent amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; those rules provide 
some guidance as to how excessive expense and difficulty 
may be avoided and how discovery should proceed. 
 
In December 2015, a series of amendments to the 
Federal Rules were enacted to improve a system of civil 
litigation that “in many cases . . . has become too expensive, 
time-consuming, and contentious, inhibiting effective access 
to the courts.”74  To counter these problems, the 2015 
amendments placed a greater emphasis on judicial 
involvement in discovery and case management and 
cooperation among litigants’ counsel.75 
                                              
74 Chief Justice John Roberts, “2015 Year-End Report on the 
Federal Judiciary,” Dec. 31, 2015 (Roberts Report), at 4, 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2015year-endreport.pdf.  
75 Id. at 5. 
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Rule 26, which governs discovery, was among the 
rules amended.  Rule 26(b)(1) now includes a discussion of 
proportionality, stating  
 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 
party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 
needs of the case, considering the importance of 
the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 
controversy, the parties’ relative access to 
relevant information, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the 
issues, and whether the burden or expense of 
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit. 
 
As Chief Justice Roberts wrote of these amendments, 
“[t]he key here is careful and realistic assessment of actual 
need” that may “require the active involvement of a neutral 
arbiter—the federal judge—to guide decisions respecting the 
scope of discovery.”76  The instant matter is a prime example 
of the need for such controlled discovery. 
 
CFI alleges a massive, systematic effort by Victaulic to 
avoid paying marking duties on any of its imports.  Since 
Victaulic’s motion to dismiss was granted, there has been no 
answer from the defendant as to whether any of CFI’s 
allegations are true.  An answer could shed some light on 
these allegations.  Similarly, while CFI has identified millions 
                                              
76 Id. at 7. 
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of pounds of imported pipe fittings that it alleges were 
mismarked, proportional discovery would counsel in favor of 
limiting the scope of early discovery.  It will be up to the 
District Court and counsel to determine an appropriately 
limited discovery plan, perhaps reviewing the documents and 
duties paid on a representative sample of the shipments 
identified by CFI.   
 
In any event, Chief Justice Roberts noted that 
“[j]udges must be willing to take on a stewardship role, 
managing their cases from the outset rather than allowing 
parties alone to dictate the scope of discovery and the pace of 
litigation.”77  The instant matter will require the active 
involvement of the District Court, in conjunction with counsel 
and their clients, to limit the expense and burden of discovery 
while still providing enough information to allow CFI to test 
its claims on the merits.   
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order of 
the District Court denying CFI’s motions for relief from 
judgment and for leave to amend its complaint.  We will 
remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
                                              
77 Id. at 10. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in 
part, and dissenting from the judgment. 
 
 Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC (“CFI”) brings this 
action under the False Claims Act, alleging a ten-year scheme 
to defraud the government on the basis of statistical evidence 
alone.1  That evidence consists almost entirely of non-random 
observations gleaned from product advertisements on the 
website of the online retailer eBay.  Whereas Twombly and 
Iqbal require plausible allegations of wrongdoing, CFI gives 
us unsupported assumptions and numerical guesswork.  
Whereas Rule 9(b) requires that fraud be alleged with 
particularity, CFI gives us ten years of raw import data and 
insists there is evidence of fraud in there, somewhere, while 
completely failing to identify which shipments, during which 
time periods, at which ports were illegal.  The mere 
suggestion of fraud, which is all CFI has alleged, is not 
enough to state a plausible claim or to satisfy the heightened 
                                                 
1 It may be worth noting that CFI appears to be a legal entity 
created solely for the purpose of bringing this case.  See 
Victaulic Br. at 4 (“CFI does not appear to have any function 
beyond pursuing this case against Victaulic.  CFI was formed 
in August 2012, which was the same time when CFI began its 
‘investigation’ of Victaulic’s activities.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
The government has the right to intervene in order to 
prosecute a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act on its 
own behalf.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4).  The government 
declined to do so here.  See J.A. 104, ECF No. 3.   
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pleading standards of Rule 9(b). 
 
 Faced with obvious deficiencies in CFI’s allegations, 
the District Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the complaint—with prejudice—and then denied CFI’s 
motion to reopen the judgment so that it could file an 
amended complaint.  I disagree with the majority’s decision to 
vacate the District Court’s dismissal and reinstate this case.  
When asserting a violation of the False Claims Act, a plaintiff 
must state a plausible claim and allege fraud with 
particularity.  CFI has failed in both respects.  I therefore 
partially dissent.2  
 
I. The Proposed Amended Complaint Fails to Allege a 
Plausible Claim  
 
 CFI’s eight-page, 35-paragraph complaint alleges that 
Victaulic, a manufacturer of iron and steel pipe fittings, has 
engaged in a decade-long scheme to defraud the government 
by mismarking its imported products.  The District Court 
dismissed that complaint for failure to allege a plausible claim 
                                                 
2 I agree with the majority that the District Court erred by 
concluding that the False Claims Act does not permit claims 
on the basis of failure to pay marking duties.  Accordingly, I 
dissent only in part. 
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within the meaning of Twombly and Iqbal.3  When CFI 
moved to reopen the judgment, the District Court denied that 
motion too—this time, not on plausibility grounds, but for 
reasons that included undue delay and CFI’s failure to satisfy 
Rule 9(b)’s heightened standard for pleading fraud in its 
proposed amended complaint.4   
 
 Because this is an appeal from the District Court’s 
final order, we would ordinarily limit our review to issues 
arising from CFI’s motion to reopen the judgment—i.e., 
undue delay and the proper application of Rule 9(b).  But the 
real problems with the proposed amended complaint run 
deeper.  Since “[w]e exercise plenary review over a decision 
granting a motion to dismiss[,] . . . ‘[w]e may affirm the 
district court on any ground supported by the record.’”5  I 
therefore think it’s worth exploring whether the proposed 
amended complaint even raises a plausible allegation under 
the False Claims Act, much less whether it makes those 
allegations with the requisite particularity.   
                                                 
3 United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. 
Victaulic Co., No. 13-cv-2983 (MAM), 2014 WL 4375638, at 
*13–16 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2014) (relying on Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009)). 
4 United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. 
Victaulic Co., No. 13-cv-2983 (MAM), 2015 WL 1608455, at 
*8–10, 15–19 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2015). 
5 Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 
2014) (quoting Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 
(3d Cir. 1999)).   
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 CFI says that before suing Victaulic it conducted a 
“complex and multifaceted analysis.”6  I am not willing to 
credit this characterization.  In my view, CFI’s investigation 
into Victaulic’s imports is incapable of supporting the kinds 
of statistical inferences that CFI wants us to draw.  To explain 
why, I begin by summarizing some basic principles of valid 
survey design.  I then apply those principles to assess the 
plausibility of the allegations in CFI’s proposed amended 
complaint.   
A. The Fundamentals of Statistical Sampling   
 
 A valid statistical survey essentially has three steps:  (i) 
identify a population of interest, (ii) take a random sample 
from that population, and (iii) use the observations in the 
sample to draw inferences about the population as a whole.7  
We see examples of this process every day in opinion polls.  
A survey firm will identify a population to study, draw a 
random sample from that population, and then, based on its 
observations, make inferences about that population to a 
greater or lesser degree of confidence based on the sample 
size.  These principles apply to all probabilistic surveys, 
                                                 
6 Proposed Am. Compl. (J.A. 302–33) ¶ 4.   
7 See 1 Mod. Sci. Evidence § 5:14 (2015–2016 ed.) (“In 
surveys that use probability sampling methods, a sampling 
frame (that is, an explicit list of units in the population) is 
created.  Individual units then are selected by a kind of lottery 
procedure, and measurements are made on the selected units, 
which constitute ‘the sample.’ The objective is to generalize 
from the sample to the population.”).   
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including the kind of survey that CFI conducted—or, at least, 
attempted to conduct—in this case.  
 
 There are a few critical features that are necessary for 
such a survey to be valid.  First, it is important for the sample 
to be drawn from the correct population of interest.    When a 
survey makes an error relating to “the specification of the 
population to be sampled . . . any estimates made on the basis 
of the sample data will be biased.”8  This makes sense.  If 
there are differences between the population being studied 
and the population actually sampled, the survey’s results will 
necessarily be unreliable.  
 
 Second, a valid statistical sample must be drawn 
randomly.  Surveys rely on random sampling because “[t]he 
statistics derived from observations or measurements of 
random samples permit one to estimate the parameters of the 
population.”9  Indeed, “random selection is the only selection 
mechanism . . . that automatically guarantees the absence of 
selection bias.  That is because when we use random sampling 
                                                 
8 1 McCormick on Evid. § 208 (7th ed. updated through 
2016).  To be a bit more technical, “[a] measurement 
procedure is unbiased if it produces measures that are right on 
average across repeated applications; that is, if we apply the 
same measurement procedure to a large number of subjects, 
sometimes the measure will be too large and sometimes too 
small, but on average it will yield the right answer.”  Lee 
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1, 92 (2002). 
9 1 McCormick on Evid. § 208.  
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we are, by definition, assuring the absence of any association 
that may exist between selection rules and the variables in our 
study.”10  In a nonrandom sample, by contrast, the selection 
rule “may inadvertently . . .  introduce bias.”11  
 
 It is frequently the case that a random sample is either 
not available or difficult to obtain.  Survey methodologists 
and statisticians have developed numerous tools to address 
this problem.  What a researcher cannot do, however, is draw 
a nonrandom “convenience sample” simply because the data 
is close at hand and then assume away all the statistical 
problems that such a technique creates.12  Unfortunately, this 
is precisely what CFI did.  In the words of Charles Seife, we 
are about to be “Fooled by the Numbers.”13   
B. Step One:  The Review of Victaulic Import 
Data  
 CFI claims that its president “personally spen[t] at least 
                                                 
10 Epstein & King, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 110. 
11 Id. at 111.  
12 Such a sample “provides no rigorous assurance that the 
sample will represent the population of interest.”  Ben K. 
Grunwald, Suboptimal Social Science and Judicial Precedent, 
161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1409, 1424 (2013).   
13 See Charles Seife, Proofiness:  How You’re Being Fooled 
by the Numbers 8 (2010) (“[I]f you want to get people to 
believe something . . .  just stick a number on it.  Even the 
silliest absurdities seem plausible the moment they are 
expressed in numerical terms.”). 
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700 hours” on its investigation,14 a figure that is fairly 
extraordinary on its own and only becomes more so once it 
becomes clear what CFI actually did—and, more to the point, 
did not do.  
 
 CFI’s first step was to estimate the proportion of 
Victaulic products imported from overseas in recent years.  
To do so, it reviewed figures from a subscription service, 
Zepol, that aggregates data from ships carrying imports into 
the United States.15  CFI tells us that Zepol is an “expensive 
fee-based subscription service” with an annual cost of 
$5,995.16  It also says that the information in Zepol’s database 
is so unwieldy as to be comprehensible only by persons who 
have “worked with customs import data over many years . . . 
[who can] understand what conclusions can properly be 
drawn” from such data.17  
 
 CFI queried the database for the word “Victaulic” for 
the nine-year period between 2003 and 2012.18  Its president 
then “personally reviewed the narrative description for every 
import entry and culled through line by line to eliminate items 
that were not iron or steel pipe fittings.”19  We are told that 
                                                 
14 Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 4.   
15 Id. ¶ 23.   
16 Id. ¶¶ 23–24.   
17 Id. ¶ 25.   
18 Id. ¶ 26. 
19 Id. ¶ 28.     
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“[o]nly upon completing the above multi-step process was 
CFI able to obtain a usable database from which Victaulic’s 
imports could then be segregated and tabulated by country 
and from which CFI could draw reliable conclusions.”20  In an 
era when Microsoft Excel or, indeed, any data management 
software can filter data based on complex queries, it is 
completely unclear why this kind of line-by-line effort was 
even necessary. 
 
 At this point, CFI had constructed a dataset purporting 
to show all of Victaulic’s imports of pipe fittings into the 
United States.  According to these figures, over the period 
from 2003 through 2012 Victaulic imported 83 million 
pounds of pipe fittings from China and Poland (an average of 
about 9.2 million pounds per year).21  Between 2010 and 
2012, this annual average climbed to 15.2 million pounds per 
year.22  
 
 Of course, that figure is not helpful without some 
baseline.  Knowing this, CFI sought to convert Victaulic’s 
raw imports into a dollar figure, and then to compare that 
dollar figure against Victaulic’s total revenue.  Unfortunately, 
the Zepol database aggregates information about Victaulic’s 
imports across several, differently-priced product lines.  CFI’s 
approach to solving this problem was, at best, extremely 
problematic.    
 
                                                 
20 Id. ¶ 30.   
21 Id. ¶ 31. 
22 Id.  
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 CFI started by using Victaulic’s 2011 price list to 
compile “a total of 147 separate price observations for 49 
different products with three sizes each to arrive at an 
estimated per pound price of $36.40.”23  CFI admits that this 
figure may not be reliable, however, because “[d]iscounts off 
price lists . . . are very common in the pipe fittings industry.”24  
CFI therefore “assume[s] conservatively” that Victaulic’s 
imported pipe fittings were sold “at deeply discounted prices” 
averaging between $10 and $15 per pound.25  Using these 
figures, CFI estimates that, during the period from 2010 
through 2012, Victaulic’s annual sales deriving from Chinese 
and Polish imports were somewhere between $152 million 
and $228 million per year.26  
 
 Next, CFI cites unnamed “[a]uthoritative independent 
sources” for the proposition that “Victaulic’s annual revenue 
is in the approximate range of $250–280 million.”27  It then 
uses these numbers to claim that pipe fittings imported from 
China and Poland accounted for between 54% and 91% of 
                                                 
23 Id. ¶ 32.   
24 Id. ¶ 37.   
25 Id. ¶ 40.   
26 The $152 million figure comes from multiplying 15.2 
million pounds by an average price of $10 per pound.  The 
$228 million figure comes from multiplying 15.2 million 
pounds by an average price of $15 per pound. 
27 Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 33. 
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Victaulic’s annual sales between 2010 and 2012.28  
 
 Drawing all inferences in CFI’s favor, I accept—at 
least for the sake of argument—that foreign-made pipe 
fittings accounted for between 54% and 91% of Victaulic’s 
annual sales during the period from 2010 through 2012.29  
Notice, however, that nothing in the proposed amended 
complaint so far supports the plausible inference that 
Victaulic defrauded the government, much less that it did so 
over ten years.  To support that allegation, CFI relies on its 
so-called “eBay investigation.”  And that is where CFI’s 
claims ultimately fail.   
                                                 
28 The 54% figure comes from dividing $152 million 
(Victaulic’s estimated annual sales from imports at a price of 
$10 per pound) by $280 million (the upper-bound of 
Victaulic’s annual sales).  The 91% figure comes from 
dividing $228 million (Victaulic’s estimated annual sales 
from imports at a price of $15 per pound) by $250 million 
(the lower-bound of Victaulic’s annual sales).   
29 When an appeal comes to us at the motion to dismiss 
stage, “we must accept all well-pled allegations in the 
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the non-moving party.”  Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 
450, 452 (3d Cir. 2006).  The tension here is that “all aspects 
of a complaint must rest on ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’ 
and not ‘mere conclusory statements’”—and some of CFI’s 
arithmetic seems awfully conclusory.  Finkelman v. Nat’l 
Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79). 
11 
 
C. Step Two:  The “eBay Investigation” and Its 
Obvious Deficiencies  
 At this point in our narrative, CFI (i) believes that 
Victaulic is importing large quantities of foreign-made pipe 
fittings into the United States, and (ii) suspects that Victaulic 
is not properly marking those pipe fittings to reflect their 
countries-of-origin.  But how to prove those suspicions?  
CFI’s answer was to survey the online retailer eBay in an 
attempt to draw inferences about the broader U.S. market.   
 
 To that end, CFI’s president personally spent between 
one and five hours per day over a period of six months 
compiling eBay postings for Victaulic pipe fittings.30  CFI 
then examined these postings to determine whether they 
contained photographs of Victaulic products with visible 
country-of-origin marks.   
 
 What was the goal of this investigation?  Well, recall 
that CFI estimates that between 54% to 91% of Victaulic’s 
pipe fittings were imported from China and Poland between 
2010 and 2012.  According to CFI, we should therefore 
expect to see “Made in China” or “Made in Poland” markings 
on somewhere between 54% and 91% of all Victaulic pipe 
fittings for sale in the United States—and, by corollary, for 
sale on eBay.31   
 
 That hypothesis, however, assumes, with no basis in 
alleged fact, that secondhand postings on eBay are 
                                                 
30 Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 65. 
31 Id. ¶ 55.   
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representative of all Victaulic products for sale in the United 
States.  It also assumes, again with no basis in alleged fact, 
that photographs in eBay postings (i) depict the very items 
being sold rather than stock images or photographs of other 
inventory, and (ii) depict those items in such a way that 
foreign country-of-origin markings would be clearly visible.  
Both of these assumptions are questionable.  First, Victaulic 
claims that “[its] full product line is not available on eBay,” 
meaning that “[r]esellers on eBay would only have access to 
small quantities of overstock and/or older, used, salvaged, 
stolen, or counterfeit products.”32  Second, CFI’s complaint 
alleges that U.S.-made products tend to command a higher 
price than foreign-made products.33  Resellers on eBay 
therefore may have a strong incentive to obscure foreign 
country-of-origin markings.  We, of course, cannot credit a 
defendant’s factual assertions at the motion to dismiss stage—
but doing so is different from recognizing that the plausibility 
of CFI’s allegations depends on multiple unsupported 
assumptions about how eBay actually functions.   
 
 What is fairly clear to this point is that CFI did not 
actually base its conclusions on a comprehensive analysis of 
Victaulic pipe fittings for sale on eBay.  What CFI did instead 
was to construct a subsample of a subsample of a subsample.  
For example:  
                                                 
32 Victualic Br. at 39. 
33 See Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 87. 
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 CFI began by searching eBay for 
“Victaulic” in the “new” subset of the 
“fittings” product category.  These 
searches “typically resulted in about 600 
active eBay listings daily.”34 
 In some postings, the word “Victaulic” 
appeared in the title, but it was clear that 
the posting was not actually for a 
Victaulic pipe fitting.  These postings 
were excluded.35  
 Some postings were for “old stock.”  
These were excluded because CFI’s 
analysis “was intended to examine 
products of relatively recent manufacture 
(e.g., from 2005 to the present).”  That 
2005 number is surprising because CFI’s 
earlier calculations focus on import 
figures for the period from 2010 to 
2012—to say nothing of the fact that CFI 
actually alleges a fraudulent scheme 
going back to 2003.   
                                                 
34 Id. ¶ 65. 
35 Id. ¶ 66.   
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 At this point, 20% of postings “did not 
include actual photos of the products for 
sale.”36  These, too, were excluded.  
Eliminating listings without photos, of 
course, is the same thing as assuming 
that 100% of the pipe fittings advertised 
in those listings lacked foreign country-
of-origin marks—an assumption that is 
itself deeply problematic. 
 
 After filtering the data this way, CFI identified 221 
postings for Victaulic pipe fittings that contained 
photographs.  Of those 221 postings, 29 contained 
photographs of products marked as being made in the United 
States; three contained photographs of products with foreign 
country-of-origin marks; and 189 contained photographs 
where no country-of-origin marks were apparent.37  Of the 
189 postings in the third group, “there were approximately 40 
listings that had limited or unclear photographs, such that it 
would have been difficult to see country-of-origin 
markings.”38   
 
 CFI decided that it wanted more information about the 
40 listings with indeterminate photographs.  Rather than 
purchase products from all 40 of them, however, CFI 
                                                 
36 Id. ¶ 67.   
37 Id. ¶¶ 70, 72.   
38 Id. ¶ 74.   
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purchased just ten to examine in person.  CFI never says 
whether these products were randomly chosen.  Of these, it 
turned out that one was not a Victaulic product at all, four had 
no country-of-origin markings, four had U.S. country-of-
origin markings, and one item “was packed with a U.S. origin 
label, but did not appear to have a permanent origin 
marking.”39   
 
 If we assume (again, with no basis in alleged fact) that 
the ten-product sample is representative of all products in the 
group of 40 postings with indeterminate photographs, then the 
results of the eBay study looks like this:  
                                                 
39 Id. ¶ 75.     
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Table 1:  Results of CFI’s eBay Investigation  
Victaulic Products  
Original 
Tally 
Extrapolations 
U.S. country-of-origin 
markings  
29 45 
Foreign country-of-
origin markings 
3 3 
No country-of-origin 
markings  
149 169 
Photographs unclear  40 ---  
Not Victaulic products 
at all  
--- 4 
Total Postings 221 221  
 This is the extent of the evidence of a decade-long 
scheme to defraud the government.  CFI points to the 
extrapolated “fact” that 169 of the Victaulic products in its 
221-item sample—about 75% of the total—lack country-of-
origin markings.40  Recall, too, that CFI asserts that at least 
54% of Victaulic products for sale on eBay should be stamped 
“made in China” or “made in Poland.”  CFI therefore 
                                                 
40 CFI extrapolates that half of the products from the 40 
postings with unclear photographs must bear U.S. markings 
and half must bear no country-of-origin markings.  Id. ¶ 77.  
This seems to be an error.  If we are going to use CFI’s bogus 
methodology, we should at least follow its logic and conclude 
that one-tenth of the 40 items at issue were not made by 
Victaulic.   
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contends that “[t]he only reasonable conclusion that can be 
drawn from [its] analysis is that Victaulic has unlawfully 
imported huge quantities of unmarked pipe fittings from its 
foreign manufacturing plants and has then sold those 
unmarked fittings in the U.S.”41   
 
 Based on the record before us, here is the entire logical 
chain supporting CFI’s allegations:  
 Step one:  Based on import data and 
information from unnamed sources, 54% 
to 91% of Victaulic’s annual sales 
between 2010 and 2012 derived from 
imports of pipe fittings from China and 
Poland.   
 Step two:  We should therefore expect 
that, in any representative sample of 
Victaulic’s products for sale in the U.S. 
market, 54% to 91% of items should bear 
country-of-origin markings from China 
and Poland.  
 Step three:  Assume that Victaulic 
products available on eBay constitute a 
perfectly representative sample of 
Victaulic products for sale in the United 
States.   
                                                 
41 Id. ¶ 81.   
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 Step four:  Assume that photographs on 
eBay are not stock images but rather 
accurate depictions of the physical items 
being sold. 
 Step five:  Assume that a nonrandom 
sample of 221 of Victaulic items for sale 
on eBay is also perfectly representative 
of Victaulic products sold in the United 
States.   
 Step six:  While 40 items out of this 221-
item sample contain unclear 
photographs, assume that we can rectify 
that problem with a nonrandom sample 
of ten items, examined in person.  
 Step seven:  Extrapolating from these 
two nonrandom samples, we can 
conclude that over 75% of Victaulic 
products for sale on eBay lack country-
of-origin marks.  
 Step eight:  Because we have assumed 
that eBay is perfectly representative of 
the U.S. market, we can conclude that 
75% of all Victaulic products sold in the 
United States must lack country-of-origin 
marks as well.   
19 
 
 Step nine:  Therefore, Victaulic has been 
defrauding the United States government 
of accrued marking duties since at least 
2003. 
 This chain of inferences simply does not support a 
plausible allegation of fraud.  
 
 I turn first to the relevant legal standard.  As we 
recently explained in Finkelman v. National Football 
League,42 the essence of the Supreme Court’s plausibility test 
under Twombly and Iqbal is that allegations merely consistent 
with liability are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.43  
When assessing whether a complaint raises sufficiently 
plausible allegations, the Supreme Court has instructed us to 
“draw on [our] judicial experience and common sense.”44   
 
 My common sense tells me that a plaintiff cannot 
plausibly allege a ten-year scheme to defraud the government 
on the basis of 221 eBay postings.  At most, the eBay study 
                                                 
42 810 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2016).   
43 Id. at 201 (stating that the Twombly plaintiffs “looked 
around and saw conduct consistent with a conspiracy, but they 
saw no facts that indicated more plausibly that a conspiracy 
actually existed”); see also Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 
F.3d 121, 133 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[P]ossibility’ is no longer the 
touchstone for pleading sufficiency after Twombly and Iqbal.  
Plausibility is what matters.”). 
44 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.   
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provides evidence consistent with fraud.45  It does not provide 
any evidence more plausibly suggesting that fraud actually 
occurred. 
 
 The first problem is that CFI surveyed the wrong 
population.  It would have been perfectly acceptable for CFI 
to draw a random sample from eBay if it was trying to draw 
inferences about the larger universe of Victaulic products 
actually sold on eBay.  The problem is that CFI wants to use 
eBay as a proxy for the entire U.S. market for Victaulic pipe 
fittings.  Unfortunately, CFI never sampled that larger 
population.  CFI could have rectified this problem by making 
factual allegations sufficient to support the plausible inference 
that eBay serves as an appropriate proxy for the entire U.S. 
market, but the only allegations to that effect in the complaint 
are entirely conclusory.46  This is unsurprising, since there is 
                                                 
45 I say “evidence consistent with fraud” because, of course, 
CFI could have run the exact same flawed study, with the 
same faulty criteria, and come up with a sample of 221 eBay 
postings in which a large proportion of postings did depict 
foreign country-of-origin markings.  In this sense, the results 
of the eBay study are “more consistent” with fraud than the 
alternative.  But this is different from concluding that the 
eBay study actually allows us to draw any meaningful 
inferences about Victaulic’s behavior. 
46 CFI claims that eBay is “a reliable evidentiary source.”  
(Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 64.)  But “we have been careful to 
note that, even at the pleading stage, ‘we need not accept as 
true unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences.’”  
Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 202 (quoting Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 
F.3d 472, 500 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Asserting that eBay is a 
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no reason to believe that eBay—an e-commerce platform that 
sells everything from clothing to electronics to collectible 
coins, sometimes via auction and sometimes via direct person-
to-person transactions—looks or functions anything like the 
broader market for iron and steel pipe fittings. 
 
 This brings us to the second problem with the eBay 
study—the fact that CFI did not take a random sample at all.  
Thus, even if we were to treat eBay as a viable stand-in for 
the U.S. market, the eBay study is still fatally flawed because 
CFI did not take a random sample of Victaulic products for 
sale on eBay.  Instead, it spent weeks building its own curated 
subset of 221 postings, all the while applying any number of 
criteria (including the requirement that postings contain 
photographs) likely to skew its results.  This is to say nothing 
of the fact that CFI’s actual conclusions involve additional 
extrapolations based on the ten Victaulic products that CFI 
examined in person.  CFI constructed a convenience sample, 
not a random one, and such a sample “provides no rigorous 
assurance that the sample will represent the population of 
interest.”47     
 
 The District Court raised these very objections when it 
                                                                                                             
 
“reliable evidentiary source” from which to draw conclusions 
about the broader U.S. market is exactly the kind of 
“unsupported conclusion” we have traditionally rejected.   
47 Grunwald, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1424.   
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dismissed CFI’s first complaint.48  In an effort to respond to 
these concerns, CFI hired Dr. Abraham J. Wyner, Director of 
the Undergraduate Program in Statistics at the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, to write a declaration that it 
attached as an exhibit to the proposed amended complaint.  
Unfortunately, Dr. Wyner fails to articulate any independent 
justifications for CFI’s methodology.  Instead, his declaration 
rests entirely on CFI’s own conclusory assumptions about 
eBay.  Here is the key language:  
                                                 
48 Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC, 2014 WL 4375638, 
at *15 (“Even if the Court accepts CFI’s assertion that eBay 
listings constitute a reasonable representative sample of the 
secondary sale market for pipe fittings in the United States, or 
that an examination of 221 advertisements from eighty-one 
sellers over a six-month period could provide data from which 
to draw accurate wider conclusions about millions of pounds 
of product imported over a decade, and even assuming that 
CFI has accurately identified, dated, and examined every 
Victaulic pipe fitting on eBay, CFI has alleged no facts to 
show that any of the unmarked pipe fittings on eBay are not, 
in fact, U.S.-made.”). 
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My analysis is based on . . . very reasonable and 
quite conservative assumptions . . . .  I will 
assume that the slice of the secondary market 
for Victaulic pipe fittings represented by eBay 
contains a proportion of imported products at 
least approximately similar to the proportion of 
imported products among all U.S. sales and that 
any significant deviation is caused only by 
chance.49 
 The sleight of hand here is to assert, without any basis 
in alleged fact, that it is “very reasonable” to assume that the 
universe of products being sold on eBay somehow mirrors the 
entire U.S. market. Indeed, the entire rhetorical gambit of the 
Wyner declaration is to repeat CFI’s conclusory allegations 
back to the reader in more technical-sounding terms.  A few 
examples illustrate the point.  
 
 First, Dr. Wyner recognizes that the findings from the 
eBay investigation “could be skewed” if eBay were not 
representative of the U.S. market, but he says that these fears 
are “contrary to [CFI’s] actual observations of eBay as a 
diverse sales outlet with a representative national cross-
section of Victaulic pipe fittings, including geographically 
and by supplier and product variety.”50  This conclusory 
language is lifted directly from the proposed amended 
                                                 
49 J.A. 359–60 ¶¶ 11–12 (emphasis added). 
50 Id. at 360–61 ¶ 13. 
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complaint.51     
 
 Second, Dr. Wyner acknowledges that the validity of 
the eBay study depends on the accuracy of photographs in 
eBay postings, but he downplays that concern because 
“[a]ccording to [CFI] . . . the vast majority of relevant listings 
had pictures and the vast majority of these pictures provided 
views of the Victaulic product such that a country-of-origin 
marking would have been visible had it existed.”52  In other 
words:  the eBay study is accurate because CFI says it is.  
 
 Third, while Victaulic warns that “eBay sellers may 
have concealed import markings,” Dr. Wyner tells us that 
“[t]his is inconsistent with the evidence provided by [CFI] 
that only 40 of the 221 items had incomplete or unclear 
images.”53  This mode of reasoning is exactly backwards.  If 
the results of a survey are biased, those same results cannot 
support the reliability of the survey design in the first 
instance.  
 
 Accordingly, Dr. Wyner’s conclusion—that “assuming 
the validity of [his assumptions], [he] would be more than 
                                                 
51 See Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 61 (“eBay is an active and 
diverse secondary sales outlet for Victaulic products.”); id. ¶ 
64 (“The eBay listings identified included a representative 
national cross-section of Victaulic iron and steel pipe fittings, 
including, in most cases, product photos, making it a reliable 
evidentiary source.”).   
52 J.A. 361 ¶ 15 (parentheticals omitted). 
53 Id. at 363 ¶ 19. 
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99.9% confident that Victaulic is improperly marking a 
significant portion of its imports”—is profoundly 
misleading.54  If I were to assume that the judges of the Third 
Circuit comprise an accurate cross-section of the U.S. 
population, I would then be able to conclude that a startlingly 
high proportion of the general public has a law degree.  But of 
course, it would be frivolous to make that assumption in the 
first instance.  Understood in context, Dr. Wyner’s declaration 
is little more than a reflection of CFI’s own unsupported 
assumptions about eBay, only dressed up in more persuasive-
sounding statistical jargon.  For this reason, his declaration 
completely fails to nudge CFI’s allegations across the 
plausibility threshold.  
 
 Stepping away from the specifics of CFI’s 
investigation, the significant issue in this case concerns how 
we think about the plausibility standard when a complaint 
rests entirely on statistical evidence.  In the mine run of cases, 
of course, Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence will 
filter out unreliable statistical evidence in due course.55  But 
to my mind, we act contrary to Twombly and Iqbal when we 
refuse to ask whether statistical evidence actually supports a 
plausible inference of wrongdoing at all, particularly when a 
                                                 
54 Id. at 360 ¶ 12. 
55 See Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 
(3d Cir.1997) (“Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is the 
role of the trial judge to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to ensure that 
any and all expert testimony or evidence is not only relevant, 
but also reliable.”  (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). 
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complaint rests on statistical evidence alone.  In the words of 
one observer, “[s]tatistical studies are neither magic nor snake 
oil, and the experts neither sorcerers nor (generally speaking) 
charlatans.  Rather, what legal actors need to do is treat 
statistical studies critically.”56  Just so—even at the motion to 
dismiss stage.  
  
 A recent case from the Second Circuit illustrates this 
point.  In Burgis v. New York City Department of Sanitation,57 
the plaintiffs alleged that officials had “discriminated against 
them and others similarly situated on the basis of their race 
and/or national origin in the [Department of Sanitation’s] 
promotional practices.”58  In support of their Equal Protection 
claim, they relied exclusively on statistical evidence.  The 
Second Circuit held for the first time that, in a case alleging 
employment discrimination, “statistics alone may be 
sufficient” to get past the motion to dismiss stage.59   
 
 But the Second Circuit also stated that, “to show 
discriminatory intent . . . based on statistics alone, the 
statistics must not only be statistically significant in the 
                                                 
56 Edward K. Cheng, Fighting Legal Innumeracy, 17 Green 
Bag 2d 271, 275 (2014), available at 
http://www.greenbag.org/v17n3/v17n3_articles_cheng.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2016). 
57 798 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1202 
(2016). 
58 Id. at 66.   
59 Id. at 69.   
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mathematical sense, but they must also be of a level that 
makes other plausible non-discriminatory explanations very 
unlikely.”60  The plaintiffs in Burgis “failed to allege statistics 
that me[t] the standards articulated above,” in part because 
their evidence “show[ed] only the raw percentages of White, 
Black, and Hispanic individuals at each employment level, 
without providing any detail as to the number of individuals at 
each level, the qualifications of individuals in the applicant 
pool and of those hired for each position, or the number of 
openings at each level.”61  In the Second Circuit’s view, this 
was not enough to allege a viable claim.  
 
 Burgis demonstrates that numbers alone are not 
enough to get a litigant past the motion to dismiss stage.  
Rather, a litigant’s statistical evidence must be reliable 
enough to raise a plausible inference of wrongdoing.  Here, I 
believe that a basic facility with statistical concepts 
demonstrate that the plaintiff’s eBay study supports no 
plausible inference at all—let alone one that surpasses the 
high bar to allege fraud.62   
 
 The ultimate lesson of Twombly and Iqbal is that a 
federal lawsuit is not a mechanism to confirm a vague 
suspicion that fraudulent conduct occurred.  Sturdier factual 
allegations are necessary.  The Twombly plaintiffs, observing 
parallel conduct in the marketspace, were awfully concerned 
about an antitrust conspiracy.  Finkelman himself observed 
                                                 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 70.   
62 See discussion infra at pages 22–25. 
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higher prices in the resale market for Super Bowl tickets and 
had “a strong suspicion that [his] ticket[s] would have been 
cheaper if more tickets had been available for purchase by 
members of the general public.”63 CFI browses postings on 
eBay and has a powerful inkling that Victaulic has been 
mismarking its products.  In all these instances, what is 
lacking is either some first-person account indicating that 
unlawful conduct has actually occurred, or at the very least, 
some other generalized allegation that raises a plausible 
inference of wrongdoing.   
 
 To be fair, there is one moment in the Proposed 
Amended Complaint when CFI tries to offer a first-person 
account of fraudulent conduct.  Here it is:  
One witness, who has worked for many years in 
the pipe and tube industry, recalls a customer 
procuring Victaulic pipe fittings that the 
company represented were 100% U.S. 
manufactured.  This witness observed that at the 
bottom of one box of Victaulic inventory, a 
packing list indicated that the products had 
originated from Poland.  None of the Victaulic 
pipe fittings were marked with any foreign 
country name, however.64 
 This is CFI’s best evidence:  one unnamed witness in 
an unknown location who, one time, saw one box of Victaulic 
pipe fittings that appeared to be mismarked.  That single 
                                                 
63 Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 201.   
64 Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 83.   
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anecdote simply cannot be enough to support plausible 
allegations of a ten-year scheme to defraud the government.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the District Court’s denial of 
CFI’s motion to reopen the judgment on this alternative 
ground.   
II. The Proposed Amended Complaint Also Fails to 
Satisfy Rule 9(b) 
 
 I would also conclude that the proposed amended 
complaint fails to comply with Rule 9(b).  CFI’s pleadings 
contain “voluminous records detailing the shipments at issue, 
when they entered the country, the alleged problems with 
those shipments, and, by operation of law, when liability 
would have attached.”65  In the majority’s view, “nothing 
more is required to give Victaulic adequate notice of the 
claims raised against it.”66  I respectfully disagree.   
 
 We start with the applicable law.  Rule 9(b) requires 
that “a party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake.”67  In Foglia v. Renal Ventures 
Management, LLC,68 we explained that two approaches had 
emerged in the Courts of Appeals regarding how to comply 
with Rule 9(b) in a False Claims Act suit.  Under one 
approach, “a plaintiff must show ‘representative samples’ of 
                                                 
65 Majority Op. Typescript at 24–25. 
66 Id. at 25. 
67 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
68 754 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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the alleged fraudulent conduct, specifying the time, place, and 
content of the acts and the identity of the actors.”69  We 
adopted a second, more lenient approach, holding that “it is 
sufficient for a plaintiff to allege ‘particular details of a 
scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that 
lead to a strong inference that claims were actually 
submitted.’”70  We rejected the stricter alternative because, in 
our view, it would have required qui tam relators to offer a 
level of “detail at the pleading stage [that] would be ‘one 
small step shy of requiring production of actual 
documentation with the complaint, a level of proof not 
demanded to win at trial and significantly more than any 
federal pleading rule contemplates.’”71 
 
 Foglia itself was a “close case as to meeting the 
requirements of Rule 9(b).”72  Still, we concluded that the 
plaintiff’s allegations were satisfactory because (i) they 
“suffice[d] to give [the defendant] notice of the charges 
against it, as is required by Rule 9(b),” and (ii) “only [the 
defendant] ha[d] access to the documents that could easily 
prove the claim one way or another—the full billing records 
from the time under consideration.”73   
  
                                                 
69 Id. at 155.   
70 Id. at 156 (quoting United States ex rel. Grubbs v. 
Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
71 Id. (quoting Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190).   
72 Id. at 158. 
73 Id. (punctuation modified).   
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 Our only precedential opinion to have applied Foglia 
in a subsequent False Claims Act case, United States ex rel. 
Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC,74 made it 
clear that Rule 9(b) still has sharper teeth than Rule 8.  We 
said there that, under Rule 9(b), “[a] plaintiff alleging fraud 
[under the False Claims Act] must . . . support its allegations 
‘with all of the essential factual background that would 
accompany the first paragraph of any newspaper story—that 
is, the who, what, when, where and how of the events at 
issue.’”75  This is a greater level of detail than that associated 
with mere notice pleading.  
 
 The proposed amended complaint does not satisfy 
these standards.  While it may be true that CFI’s complaint 
includes “voluminous records detailing the shipments at 
issue,”76 it is important to keep in mind that these records 
detail all of Victaulic’s imports from China and Poland over 
the period from 2003 through 2012.77  Based on its flawed 
eBay study, CFI insists that some unknown portion of those 
shipments must involve mismarked goods.  But CFI fails 
entirely to tell us which shipments, during which time periods, 
at which ports, were supposedly unlawful.  To suggest that 
there must be fraud there—somewhere—cannot possibly be 
                                                 
74 812 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2016). 
75 Id. at 307 (quoting In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
76 Majority Op. Typescript at 24–25. 
77 A line-by-line printout of these imports takes up 36 pages 
of the record.  See J.A. 154–89. 
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enough to satisfy Rule 9(b).  Such an approach neither 
provides us “with reliable indicia that lead to a strong 
inference that [false] claims were actually submitted,”78 nor 
tells us anything specific about “the who, what, when, where 
and how of the events at issue.’”79  It is, instead, a data dump 
camouflaged as a set of particularized allegations.80   
 
 I would therefore affirm the District Court’s 
termination of this case on this ground as well. 
III. Conclusion 
 
 The desirability of increasing or decreasing anti-fraud 
efforts through the mechanism of the False Claims Act is a 
                                                 
78 Foglia, 754 F.3d at 156 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
79 Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d at 307 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
80 This becomes immediately apparent once we step away 
from the False Claims Act and consider Rule 9(b) more 
generally.  We have held, for example, that a claim under the 
Securities Act triggers Rule 9(b) when it “sound[s] in fraud.”  
In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 270 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Would we conclude that a plaintiff alleges 
securities fraud with particularity by attaching ten years of 
prospectus statements and financial reports to a complaint and 
telling us, “There must be some fraudulent statements in there 
somewhere”?  I highly doubt it.   
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topic of heated debate.81  By highlighting the deficiencies in 
CFI’s allegations, I express no opinion on these matters, 
whose resolution lies more properly with the executive and 
legislative branches. 
 
 Even so, it is certainly within our province to enforce 
legal standards as they presently exist.  In my view, CFI 
cannot overcome the plausibility bar of Iqbal and Twombly 
because its flawed eBay study completely fails to raise a well-
supported inference of fraud.  CFI cannot satisfy Rule 9(b) 
because it has failed to allege fraud with particularity.  What’s 
more, I also believe that the District Court was correct to deny 
CFI’s motion to reopen the judgment on the ground of undue 
delay.82   
                                                 
81 See, e.g., Sean Elameto, Guarding the Guardians: 
Accountability in Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False 
Claims Act, 41 Pub. Cont. L.J. 813, 823 & nn. 77–80 (2012) 
(noting that Congress has recently considered bills that would 
relax Rule 9(b) in the context of False Claim Act suits).   
82 During the oral argument on Victaulic’s motion to 
dismiss, the District Court told CFI outright that its complaint 
was deficient.  See J.A. 195:5–13 (“[Y]ou needed something, 
sir, because your complaint is just too barebones.  I mean, 
honestly, I’ll listen to you, but, you know, if you state these, 
even if they’re facts, they’re conclusory kinds of facts that 
really under Twombly and Iqbal really don’t carry the day.” 
(scrivener’s errors corrected)).   
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 I therefore respectfully dissent.  
                                                                                                             
 
Despite this admonition, over seven months passed without 
CFI filing an amended complaint.  Even then, after the 
District Court granted Victaulic’s motion to dismiss, CFI let 
another four weeks go by before filing a motion to reopen the 
judgment.  And then, instead of offering new factual 
allegations, its proposed amended complaint was almost 
entirely an amalgamation of CFI’s original complaint and the 
allegations contained in its earlier witness declaration.  The 
District Court concluded—rightly—that CFI was engaging in 
dilatory tactics that independently merited denying CFI’s 
motion to reopen the judgment. 
